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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA  
COUNTY OF MONTEREY

HELEN ALBANO, et al.,	)	Case No.: 24CV004107
	)	
Plaintiffs,	)	<b>ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT</b>
	)	<b>COUNTY OF MONTEREY/NATIVIDAD</b>
vs.	)	<b>MEDICAL CENTER’S MOTION FOR</b>
	)	<b>SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR,</b>
COUNTY OF MONTEREY, et al.,	)	<b>ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR</b>
	)	<b>SUMMARY ADJUDICATION</b>
Defendants.	)	
	)	

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The motion of Defendant County of Monterey/Natividad Medical Center (“Natividad”) for summary judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication was heard on May 8, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 14 of the Monterey County Superior Court, with Judge Ian A. Rivamonte presiding. The Court issued a tentative ruling on May 7, 2026, and Plaintiffs<sup>1</sup> timely contested it. On the day of the hearing, Daniel R. Watkins appeared remotely on behalf of Plaintiffs, and Geoffrey Spellberg appeared in person on behalf of Natividad. After oral arguments, the Court took the matter under submission. After reviewing the parties’ papers, hearing oral argument, and taking the matter under

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<sup>1</sup> “Plaintiffs” collectively refer to the following 16 original plaintiffs in this case: (1) Helen Albano, (2) Rodrigo Alcantar, (3) Alfonso Alvarez, (4) Sierra Alvarez, (5) Elena Azmanova, (6) Lena Danilyuk, (7) Jason Garcia, (8) Jenae Jervis, (9) Vanessa King, (10) Cheyenne Moses, (11) Virginia Ortiz, (12) Ronald Scholink, (13) Yvette Sullivan, (14) Anne Thomas, (15) Lupe Vasquez Puga, and (16) Sylvester Ygay. Natividad’s motion here does not address the claims of plaintiffs Erica Garcia, Tami Grant, Kristen Pierce, and Jacqueline Siino. Those claims are covered in another summary-judgment motion, scheduled for a hearing on July 10, 2026.

1 submission, **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that Natividad’s motion for summary judgment is  
2 **GRANTED**.

3           Following the Court’s demurrer order filed on May 13, 2025, Plaintiffs’ remaining cause of  
4 action against Natividad is the Second Cause of Action for “Religious Discrimination – Failure to  
5 Provide Reasonable Accommodation in Violation of Government Code § 12940(*l*) Et Seq.”  
6 [Defense Undisputed Material Facts (“Defense Facts”) 2-3.] Natividad now moves for summary  
7 judgment or summary adjudication of the Second Cause of Action.

8           As explained below, Natividad has met its burden of demonstrating that it is immune from  
9 suit under Government Code section 855.4 (“Section 855.4”) and that liability under California’s  
10 Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) does not remove this immunity. Plaintiffs have not  
11 shown that triable factual issues exist regarding Natividad’s immunity. Therefore, Natividad’s  
12 motion, whether titled as one for summary judgment or summary adjudication regarding Plaintiffs’  
13 remaining claim against it, is **GRANTED**.

14           The Court’s ruling on the parties’ evidentiary objections, which are **SUSTAINED IN**  
15 **PART AND OVERRULED IN PART**, is summarized below. Each party’s request for judicial  
16 notice is **GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART**.

17 **Procedural History and Undisputed Facts.**

18           Natividad is part of the Monterey County Healthcare system, and Monterey County is a  
19 public entity under Government Code section 811.2. [Defense Fact 4.] Natividad was the employer  
20 of Plaintiffs. [Complaint, filed 9/30/24, at ¶¶ 1-6, 8, 10, 12-14, 16, 18-21.] On September 30, 2024,  
21 Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Natividad, claiming in their Second Cause of Action that  
22 Natividad failed to accommodate their religion-based request for an exemption from the mandatory  
23 COVID-19 vaccination order. [Defense Fact 1.] With leave of Court, Natividad filed its Amended  
24 Answer and included Section 855.4 immunity as its 33rd Affirmative Defense. [Answer, filed  
25 10/17/25, at 8:20-22.]

26           Based on its comprehensive review of relevant factors, including an examination of medical  
27 literature and studies, Natividad implemented a vaccine mandate requiring all employees to be  
28 vaccinated. [Defense Fact 9.] The decision to enforce the vaccine requirement and to prohibit non-

1 vaccinated employees from working at Natividad aimed to, and did, promote public health by  
2 preventing disease and limiting its spread within the community. [Defense Fact 10.] Employees  
3 who received exemptions were placed on leave, and Natividad sought alternative employment  
4 within the County for those individuals. [Defense Fact 12.] Natividad’s decisions to enforce the  
5 vaccine mandate, place exempt employees on leave, and restrict their ability to work in the hospital  
6 were made to support public health by preventing COVID-19 and controlling its transmission  
7 within the community. [Defense Fact 14.] In placing Plaintiffs on leave, Natividad acted with due  
8 care to safeguard its patients, staff, and the Monterey community from COVID-19. [Defense Fact  
9 15.]

10 **Legal Standard.**

11 Summary judgment or adjudication is warranted where there are no triable issues of material  
12 fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Code Civ. Proc. § 437c,  
13 subds. (c), (f); *see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.]

14 Courts follow a three-step process when reviewing a motion for summary judgment or  
15 adjudication: (1) identify the issues outlined by the pleadings; (2) evaluate whether the moving  
16 party has disproved the opponent’s claims; and (3) assess if the opposition has shown there is a  
17 triable factual issue. [*Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center* (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.]

18 A motion for summary adjudication proceeds “in all procedural respects as a motion for  
19 summary judgment.” [Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(2).] The initial burden always rests on the  
20 moving party to make a prima facie showing that no material factual issues are in dispute.  
21 [*Choochagi v. Barracuda Networks, Inc.* (2020) 60 Cal.App.5th 444, 453.] When a defendant files  
22 for summary judgment or adjudication, they satisfy their initial burden if they prove that at least one  
23 element of the cause of action cannot be established or that a complete defense exists. [Code Civ.  
24 Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).] Failure to meet this burden results in denial of the motion, ending the  
25 inquiry. [*Id.*]

26 To meet the burden of proving that a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must  
27 demonstrate that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, the needed evidence.  
28 [*Aguilar*, 25 Cal.4th at 854.] Merely pointing out the lack of evidence is not enough. [*Gaggero v.*

1 *Yura* (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.] This supporting evidence may include affidavits,  
2 declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters subject to judicial  
3 notice. [*Aguilar*, 25 Cal.4th at 855.]

4 Even if the moving defendant meets its burden, the opposing plaintiff can still defeat a  
5 summary judgment or summary adjudication motion by presenting evidence that raises a triable  
6 issue of fact. [*Aguilar*, 25 Cal. 4th at 849-850.] The plaintiff cannot rely solely on allegations or  
7 denials in its pleadings; instead, it must present specific facts indicating the existence of a triable  
8 issue of material fact concerning the cause of action. [Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2);  
9 *Choochagi*, 60 Cal.App.5th at 453.] If the plaintiff fails to do so, summary judgment or summary  
10 adjudication should be granted. [*See Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center* (2008) 159  
11 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.]

12 The court must liberally construe the evidence presented by the party opposing summary  
13 judgment or adjudication, resolving all doubts and making all reasonable inferences in favor of that  
14 party. [*Aguilar*, 25 Cal.4th at 844-845.] When reviewing such a motion, the court must consider  
15 what inferences a factfinder could reasonably draw that favor the opposing party. [*Binder v. Aetna*  
16 *Life Ins. Co.* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.] The main role of the court is to identify issues, not to  
17 decide them; only clear and indisputable inferences can lead to a legal resolution. [*Ibid.*] If evidence  
18 conflicts, factual disputes must be resolved during trial. [*Ibid.*] Furthermore, the trial court cannot  
19 weigh evidence as a factfinder would to determine credibility, nor can it grant summary judgment  
20 based on credibility assessments. [*Id.* at 840.]

21 **Requests for Judicial Notice (“RJN”).**

22 Natividad’s first request to judicially notice the documents marked as Exhibits A (Supreme  
23 Court’s Order Regarding Depublication of *Allos v. Poway Unified School Dist.*, No. S292190) and  
24 B (Order Granting Summary Judgment in *Broadstreet v. Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare*  
25 *System*, Monterey County Superior Court, Case No. 24CV004109) is **GRANTED**. [Evid Code  
26 § 452, subd. (d).]

27 Plaintiffs’ request to judicially notice the documents marked as Exhibits 1 (California  
28 Department of Public Health Order), 3 (Law Revision Commission memorandum), 4 (Law

1 Revision Commission recommendation), 6 (Legislative history of Assembly Bill 1194), and 7  
 2 (Legislative history of Assembly Bill 1194) is **GRANTED**. [Evid. Code § 452, subd. (c).]  
 3 Plaintiffs’ remaining requests are **DENIED**. The document marked as Exhibit 2 (a demurrer ruling  
 4 in an unrelated case) is irrelevant. [See *Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.* (1994) 7 Cal.4th  
 5 1057, 1063 (“[a]lthough a court may judicially notice a variety of matters, only *relevant* material  
 6 may be noticed.”) (original italics; internal citation omitted).] The exhibit marked as Exhibit 5  
 7 (California Government Tort Liability) is not official legislative history.

8 Natividad’s second request to judicially notice the demurrer papers (Exhibit A) and the  
 9 resulting order (Exhibit B) from an unrelated case filed in the Los Angeles County Superior Court is  
 10 **DENIED** as irrelevant. [*Mangini*, 7 Cal.4th at 1063.]

11 **Evidentiary Objections.**

12 The Court rules on each party’s evidentiary objections as follows:

PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS		
No(s).	Cite	Ruling
1	Bouyea Decl. at ¶ 3.	<b>OVERRULED.</b> Declarant has the requisite foundation, and Plaintiff did not dispute this fact.
2 4	Bouyea Decl. at ¶¶ 13, 19.	<b>SUSTAINED</b> for lack of foundation.
3	Bouyea Decl. at ¶ 15.	<b>SUSTAINED</b> because it is a legal conclusion as to “reasonableness” accommodation.
5	Dr. Reingold Decl. at ¶ 10.	<b>OVERRULED.</b>
6-17	Dr. Harris Decl. at ¶¶ 2, 4, 8, 10-11, 13-15, and 18-21.	<b>OVERRULED.</b>
18	Dr. Harris Decl. at ¶ 23.	<b>SUSTAINED</b> because it is a legal conclusion as to “undue harm.”
19	Dr. Harris Decl. at ¶ 24.	<b>OVERRULED.</b>
20	Dr. Harris Decl. at ¶ 25.	<b>SUSTAINED</b> because it is a legal conclusion as to “undue hardship.”

NATIVIDAD’S OBJECTIONS		
No(s).	Cite	Ruling
1	Exh. 2 to Plaintiffs’ RJN and Compendium of Evidence (“CE”)	<b>SUSTAINED</b> as irrelevant.
2	Exh. 3 to Plaintiffs’ RJN and CE	<b>OVERRULED.</b>
3	Exh. 5 to Plaintiffs’ RJN and CE	<b>SUSTAINED</b> because it is a legal conclusion as to “reasonableness” accommodation.
4-5	Exhs. 6-7 to Plaintiffs’ RJN and CE	<b>OVERRULED.</b>
6	Exh. 6 to Plaintiffs’ CE	<b>OVERRULED.</b> On May 11, 2026, Plaintiffs filed an amended declaration attaching a copy

NATIVIDAD'S OBJECTIONS		
No(s).	Cite	Ruling
		of the relevant excerpts from the certified transcript of Dr. Charles Harris's deposition.

**Discussion.**

Natividad argues that summary judgment should be granted because it has Section 855.4 immunity from FEHA liability and cites to the holding in *Allos v. Poway Unified School Dist.* (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 822 as support. [Motion at 4:16-5:4.] Plaintiffs strongly disagree and offer various arguments, including that “Section 855.4 does not provide blanket immunity for all actions taken during a public health response” and that *Allos* is not determinative. [Opp. at 6:3-7:7.] Ultimately, as discussed below, Natividad makes the stronger arguments, and therefore, its motion for summary judgment is **GRANTED**.

Generally, the Government Claims Act (the “Act”) “affords a public employee personal immunity from suit when the act or omission for which recovery is sought resulted from the exercise of the discretion vested in him.” [*Caldwell v. Montoya* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 976 (citing Gov. Code § 820.2; internal quotes omitted).] “This ‘discretionary act’ immunity extends to ‘basic’ governmental policy decisions entrusted to broad official judgment.” [*Ibid.*] The Act’s “purpose is assuring judicial abstention in areas in which the responsibility for basic policy decisions has been committed to coordinate branches of government, because any wider judicial review would place the court in the unseemly position of determining the propriety of decisions expressly entrusted to a coordinate branch of government.” [*Allos*, 112 Cal.App.5th at 833 (internal quotes, brackets, and ellipses omitted).]

Section 855.4 is part of the Act. Subdivision (a) of Section 855.4 provides that “Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury resulting from the decision to perform or not to perform any act to promote the public health of the community by preventing disease or controlling the communication of disease within the community if the decision whether the act was or was not to be performed was the result of the exercise of discretion vested in the public entity or the public employee, whether or not such discretion be abused.” Further, subdivision (b) states that a public entity or its employee is not liable for any injury “caused by an act or omission in carrying

1 out with due care” such a decision. “Neither the statutory language nor case law interpreting it  
2 suggests a defendant must qualify for immunity under both section 855.4 subdivision (a) and  
3 section 855.4 subdivision (b) in order to be immune.” [*Greenwood v. City of Los Angeles* (2023) 89  
4 Cal.App.5th 851, 865.]

5 It is undisputed that Natividad is a public entity and therefore falls within the class of  
6 entities Section 855.4 aims to protect. [Defense Fact 4.] Consequently, by seeking summary  
7 judgment based on the affirmative defense of Section 855.4 immunity, Natividad must demonstrate  
8 there is no genuine issue of material fact because any injury resulting from its failure to  
9 accommodate Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs was due to a discretionary decision made to promote  
10 public health during the COVID-19 pandemic. [*Aguilar*, 25 Cal.4th at 850; Gov. Code § 855.4.]

11 Natividad contends that *Allos* is controlling and confirms that Section 855.4 immunizes it  
12 from Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action under FEHA. [Motion at 8-10, 13.] In that case, the  
13 plaintiff was a school district employee who filed claims after the district refused to let her work  
14 only from home following the COVID-19 stay-at-home order. [*Allos*, 112 Cal.App.5th at 826-827,  
15 829-830.] She wanted to work remotely full-time because of several health problems that made her  
16 more vulnerable to COVID-19. [*Id.* at 827-829.] The plaintiff claimed she could not get vaccinated  
17 due to a “prior serious reaction/allergy” to the vaccine, which she stated was a disability the school  
18 district had to accommodate. [*Id.* at 828, 831.] Plaintiff argued that the district’s various  
19 accommodations were inadequate. [*Id.* at 829.] The trial court granted, and the appellate court  
20 affirmed, summary judgment in favor of the district because the plaintiff’s “claims were barred by  
21 section 855.4.” [*Id.* at 831-832, 834-836.] In doing so, the court in *Allos* reasoned that Section 855.4  
22 bars the plaintiff’s claims because they are rooted in the school district’s decisions about remote  
23 work and returning to the office. [*Ibid.*] Additionally, the appellate court found that the plaintiff did  
24 not clearly establish she had a disability, which weakened her FEHA disability discrimination and  
25 failure-to-accommodate claims. [*Id.* at 837.]

26 The Court agrees with Natividad that *Allos* “confirms that [Section 855.4] immunity applies  
27 here.” [Motion at 9.] Like *Allos*, Plaintiffs seek to hold Natividad responsible for harm caused by its  
28 decision to require them to be vaccinated. However, Natividad made this decision “[b]ased upon a

1 thorough evaluation of all relevant factors, including review of the relevant medical literature and  
2 medical studies...” [Defense Fact 9.] Natividad’s reason for enforcing its vaccine mandate, placing  
3 Plaintiffs on leave, and restricting their ability to work in the hospital was to “promote the public  
4 health of the community by preventing disease and controlling the communication of disease within  
5 the community.” [Defense Fact 14; *see also* Defense Fact 10.] In other words, conduct contrary to  
6 Natividad’s vaccine mandate would have been less protective of the public. Therefore, Natividad’s  
7 decision not to accommodate Plaintiffs because of its vaccine mandate arises from its efforts to  
8 protect public health. Consequently, Section 855.4 applies to Plaintiffs’ FEHA claim.

9 Plaintiffs’ arguments fail to persuade the Court to rule otherwise.

10 First, Plaintiffs argue that there was no qualifying discretionary decision. Because Dr. Harris  
11 testified that Natividad acted according to the Board of Supervisors’ direction, Plaintiffs conclude  
12 that any discretionary decisions were made by others, including public health officials at the state  
13 and local levels, whose mandates Natividad was reportedly following. [Opp. at 11:7-9.] This  
14 argument overlooks that Dr. Harris attested that the Board of Supervisors’ “directive was consistent  
15 with the decision that [he and] upper management made that unvaccinated workers were not going  
16 to be allowed to work at” Natividad. [Defense Fact 9 (citing Dr. Harris Decl. at ¶¶ 12-13).]  
17 Dr. Harris also explained how Natividad’s vaccine mandate was established. [*Ibid.*] Therefore,  
18 Natividad’s decision was independent of the California Department of Public Health’s mandate  
19 requiring health care workers to be vaccinated, while also allowing for medical and religious  
20 exemptions.

21 Second, Plaintiffs argue that paragraph 24 of Dr. Harris’s declaration confirms that the  
22 challenged conduct was based on operational and staffing concerns, not on the type of disease-  
23 control measures contemplated by Section 855.4. [Opp. at 13:21-23.] Not so. Dr. Harris stated in  
24 paragraph 24 that “[t]o the extent unvaccinated employees infected hospital staff causing that staff  
25 to miss workdays, that also strained [Natividad’s] ability to provide care and services to the patient  
26 population as this situation reduced available care resources.” Thus, Dr. Harris made it clear that the  
27 focus was on the community’s public health – the patients – rather than “operational and staffing  
28 concerns.” Plaintiffs’ reliance on *Sava v. Fuller* (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 281 is misplaced because it

1 did not involve Section 855.4. [*Id.* at 292 (“Respondents contend they are also immune under  
2 section 855.4. That section is inapplicable.”).]

3 Third, Plaintiffs are mistaken in believing that Section 855.4 only applies when the  
4 plaintiff’s injury results from exposure to a communicable disease in a physical environment. [Opp.  
5 at 17-19.] Such an interpretation contradicts the plain language of Section 855.4, which states that  
6 neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for an “injury” caused by a public health  
7 decision. [Gov. Code § 855.4, subd. (a).] The term “injury” is defined as “death, injury to a person,  
8 reputation, character, feelings or estate, of such nature that it would be actionable if inflicted by a  
9 private person.” [Gov. Code § 810.8.] The Court finds Plaintiffs’ injury stems from their  
10 termination, which resulted from Natividad’s decision to bar unvaccinated employees from patient  
11 care. [Defense Facts 12, 15.]

12 Fourth, Plaintiffs argue that *Allos* is distinguishable and point out that their “**claims arise**  
13 **from subsequent employment decisions governed by FEHA, not from any qualifying decision**  
14 **under section 855.4, subsections (a) or (b).**” [Opp. at 6 (bold in original).] The Court is not  
15 persuaded that Section 855.4 immunity does not apply to FEHA-related claims, including Plaintiffs’  
16 Second Cause of Action. California law generally recognizes that “a statutory governmental  
17 immunity overrides a statute imposing liability,” and that “absent a clear indication of legislative  
18 intent that statutory immunity is withheld or withdrawn, a specific statutory immunity applies to  
19 shield a public employee from liability imposed by a particular statute.” [*Bitner v. Dept. of*  
20 *Corrections & Rehabilitation* (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1059 (internal quotes and ellipsis  
21 omitted).] A public entity, such as Natividad, is subject to any immunity provided by statute. [Gov.  
22 Code § 815, subd. (b).] Natividad’s cited authorities in its motion demonstrate that FEHA’s  
23 mandatory duty to accommodate religious beliefs does not override statutory immunity for  
24 discretionary acts. [Motion at 13-14; *Esparza v. County of Los Angeles* (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 452,  
25 462 (FEHA did not abrogate Government Code section 818.2 immunity conferred by section  
26 818.2); *Bitner*, 87 Cal.App.5th at 1063 (“[E]ven if we were to accept that FEHA creates a  
27 mandatory duty within the meaning of [Government Code] section 815.6, section 815 provides that  
28 the immunity provision of section 844.6 takes precedence over any liability imposed by section

1 815.6, and plaintiffs’ argument to the contrary is without merit.”.)] Thus, like other statutory  
2 immunities, and as recognized in *Allos*, 112 Cal.App.5th at 835, FEHA liability does not supersede  
3 Section 855.4 immunity. The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ argument that no immunity applies when  
4 FEHA is the more specific statute was rejected in *Bitner*, 87 Cal.App.5th at 1060-1062, because the  
5 distinction between “general” and “specific” is based on subject matter. FEHA is an extensive  
6 statutory scheme designed to support a broad public policy of protecting against employment  
7 discrimination; thus, the later enactment of FEHA was not decisive.

8 Fifth, the Court disagrees with Plaintiffs’ argument that Natividad “propose[s] an  
9 interpretation of [Section] 855.4 that does violence to the very purpose of the immunity provision  
10 which must be taken into account.” [Opp at 21-22.] The Court disagrees, and the statute’s  
11 legislative history does not support Plaintiffs’ limited view of the statute. As noted by the 1963 Law  
12 Revision Commission recommendation:

13 4. Public health officials and public entities should not be liable for determining  
14 whether to impose quarantines or otherwise take action to prevent or control the  
15 spread of disease, where they have been given the legal power to determine whether  
16 or not such action should be taken. Where the law gives a public employee discretion  
17 to determine a course of conduct, liability should not be based upon the exercise of  
18 that discretion in a particular manner; for this would permit the trier of fact to  
19 substitute its judgment as to how the discretion should have been exercised for the  
20 judgment of the person to whom such discretion was lawfully committed...

21 5. Public entities and public employees should not be liable for failure to make  
22 arrests or otherwise to enforce any law. They should not be liable for failing to  
23 inspect persons or property adequately to determine compliance with health and  
24 safety regulations, nor should they be liable for negligent or wrongful issuance or  
25 revocation of licenses and permits. The government has undertaken these activities  
26 to insure public health and safety. To provide the utmost public protection,  
27 governmental entities should not be dissuaded from engaging in such activities by  
28 the fear that liability may be imposed if an employee performs his duties  
inadequately.

[Exh. 4 to Plaintiffs’ RJN at 830-831 (¶¶ 4, 5).]

Accordingly, Natividad’s motion for summary judgment is **GRANTED** because it has met  
its burden of showing that Section 855.4 immunity overrides the FEHA liability alleged in the  
Second Cause of Action. Plaintiffs have not provided any material facts raising triable factual issues  
to the contrary.

1 **Conclusion.**

2 Natividad's motion is **GRANTED**, and Natividad is entitled to summary judgment of  
3 Plaintiffs' claim against it. As detailed above, the parties' evidentiary objections are **SUSTAINED**  
4 **IN PART AND OVERRULED IN PART**, and their request for judicial notice is **GRANTED IN**  
5 **PART AND DENIED IN PART.**


6 Natividad shall prepare the Proposed Judgment consistent with this Order.

7 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

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9 DATED: May 12, 2026

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Ian A. Rivamonte  
Superior Court Judge

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